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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Bowers-Irons asserts that the trial court erred in dismis-
sing its claim for construction damages within the easement, and 
its claim that cattle guards were necessary to restore the 
fences as close as reasonably possible to their original 
condition. These claims are for breach of IPA's obligation to 
cause as least damage to the burdened property as possible, and 
to restore the property to its original condition so far as 
reasonably possible. Although these claims normally would not 
be part of a condemnation suit, IPA implicitly consented to the 
trial of those issues in this case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BOWERS-IRONS IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER FOR 
CONSTRUCTION DAMAGES WITHIN THE EASEMENT. 
Two sub-issues are presented by this appeal concerning the 
issue of whether Bowers-Irons was entitled to recover for 
construction damages within the easement: (1) Were construction 
damages within the easement included within by the condemnation 
award, and (2) if not, was Bowers-Irons entitled to recover 
those construction damages in this action. The argument below 
and in appellant's opening brief demonstrates that Utah cases 
establish that construction damages are not contemplated by nor 
included in a condemnation award. Although an action for 
recovery of construction damages may be brought as a separate 
action, IPA implicitly consented to the issue being tried in 
this action. 
A. The Condemnation Award Did Not Include Construction 
Damages. 
IPA asserts in its Summary of Argument that allowing 
Bowers-Irons to recover for construction damages would result in 
a double recovery. The cases and argument cited in Point I of 
IPA's brief, however, with one exception, establish only that 
recovery for construction damages is not generally part of a 
condemnation proceeding and is not part of the condemnation 
award. Logic compels this conclusion. The purpose of a 
condemnation award is to compensate the land owner for the fair 
market value of the land as of the date of the taking. The 
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construction damages usually do not come into existence until 
after the taking, and clearly cannot be included as part of the 
condemnation award. To hold otherwise would be to hold that an 
owner of an easement has no restriction whatsoever on the amount 
of damage which can be done to the burdened property and has no 
obligation to restore the burdened property to its original 
condition. The effect of such a holding would be to grant the 
easement owner the equivalent of fee simple title while only 
requiring payment for an easement. 
The cases cited by appellant in its opening brief establish 
that an easement owner has an obligation to cause the least 
possible damage and to return the premises to its original 
condition so far as reasonably possible. An easement owner 
which fails to do so may be held liable for damages. An award 
of such damages does not result in a double recovery. 
None of the Utah cases cited by IPA refute this rule, and 
in fact support it. IPA claims, however, that the Colorado case 
of Western Slope Gas Co. v. Lake Eldora Corp.. 521 P.2d 641 
(Colo. App. 1973) , holds that construction damage to the land 
within the right of way is not separately compensable but is a 
factor taken into account in the initial determination of the 
value of the right of way. A careful reading of that case 
indicates that it does not hold that recovery cannot be had for 
construction damages, but only holds that the initial condemna-
tion award is not based on the cost of restoring the land to its 
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initial condition, but rather on the diminution in market value 
by reason of the taking. 
As set forth above, to hold that the anticipated construc-
tion damages are included within the initial condemnation award 
is contrary to reason, because the extent of those damages 
cannot be known as of the date of the taking and frequently will 
not be known as of the date the award is made. To the extent 
that Western Slope does support a rule as advocated by IPA, it 
should be rejected by this Court. This Court should not espouse 
a rule which holds that an owner of an easement has no obliga-
tion to cause the least possible damage to the property nor to 
return the property to its original condition so far as reason-
ably possible. 
B. IPA Implicitly Consented to the Trial of the Construc-
tion Damage Issues in this Lawsuit. 
The discussion above establishes that an easement owner has 
an obligation to restore the land to its original condition 
insofar as reasonably possible, and may be held liable for 
damages if it fails to do so. Although such an action for 
damages is normally separate from the condemnation action, the 
record in this case establishes that IPA implicitly consented 
that those issues be tried in this action. Indeed, the parties 
stipulated to a settlement of the condemnation portion of the 
action and reserved for trial only the issue of "incidental" 
damages. 
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The fact that IPA implicitly consented to trial, in this 
case, of the issue of construction damages is evidenced by IPA's 
stipulation to an award of construction damages outside the 
easement. No logical or statutory distinction exists between 
construction damages within the easement or without the ease-
ment, as is established below. The distinction between the two 
was raised for the first time at the trial of this matter. 
IPA claims that recovery for construction damages outside 
the easement is included under Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-10(3) 
(1987). That section holds that the fact finder in a condemna-
tion proceeding must ascertain and assess "if the property, 
though no part thereof is taken, will be damaged by the con-
struction of the proposed improvement, the amount of such 
damages." Although this section authorizes compensation for 
damages caused by construction, those damages are not the same 
as the "construction damages" as used by the parties in this 
action. 
Appellant has discovered only three Utah cases which 
specifically cite section 78-34-10(3). Board of Education of 
Logan City School District v. Croft, 13 Utah 2d 310, 373 P.2d 
697 (1962); State v. Peterson, 12 Utah 2d 317, 366 P.2d 76 
(1961); Southern Pacific Co. v. Arthur, 10 Utah 2d 306, 352 P.2d 
693 (1960) . It is clear from a reading of these cases that 
Section 78-34-10(3) refers to a type of severance damages caused 
by a taking. "Typical" severance damages are provided for in 
Section 78-34-10(2), which provides for severance damages where 
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"the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of 
a larger parcel.11 The severance damages contemplated by 78-34-
10(3), in contrast, are those which occurred to other lands 
owned by the property owner. In Southern Pacific Co. , for 
example, the Court found that other parcels of property owned by 
the defendants were less useful as range land as a result of the 
taking of the condemned parcel of land. 352 P.2d at 697. In 
State v. Peterson, the Court made an award of severance damages 
to the remainder of the defendant's property and cited as 
support Section 78-34-10(3). 366 P.2d at 79 n. 5. In Croft, 
the Court describes the types of damages which may be covered 
under Section 78-34-10(3) as follows: 
Damages to land, by the construction of a 
public or industrial improvement, though no 
part thereof is taken as provided for under 
78-34-10(3), contrary to the rule for 
severance damages, is limited to injuries 
that would be actionable at common law, or 
where there has been some physical distur-
bance of a right, either public or private, 
which the owner enjoys in connection with 
his property and which gives it additional 
value, and which causes him to sustain a 
special damage with respect to his property 
in excess of that sustained by the public 
generally. It requires a definite physical 
injury cognizable to the senses with a 
perceptible effect on the present market 
value: such as drying up wells and springs, 
destroying lateral supports, preventing 
surface waters from running off adjacent 
lands or running surface waters onto 
adjacent lands, or the depositing of cinders 
and other foreign materials on neighboring 
lands by the permanent operation of the 
business or improvement established on the 
adjoining lands. 
373 P.2d at 699-700 (citations omitted). 
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As set forth in this example, the types of damages con-
templated by subsection 78-34-10(3) are those injuries to 
adjoining property which are unavoidably caused by the taking of 
the condemned property. The list of examples does not include 
construction damages, either within or without the easement, 
caused by the easement owner's negligence* 
The Utah case of Thomas E. Jeremy Estate v, Salt Lake City, 
87 Utah 370, 49 P.2d 405 (1935), illustrates the principle that 
construction damages outside the easement are not normally 
compensable in a condemnation proceeding. The land owner in 
that case sued the easement owner to recover damages because of 
excavated material left on the land outside the easement. The 
issue presented was whether the case was one in contract or 
negligence, as opposed to a case for wrongful taking of land. 
The Court held that the case was not one for wrongful taking, 
because the damages claimed were not part of a condemnation 
case. Implicit in the decision is the holding that the damages 
would be compensable under a breach of contract or a negligence 
theory. 
In the instant case, therefore, there was no legal reason 
to distinguish between damages to Bowers-Iron's land outside the 
easement from the damages to the land within the easement. None 
of those damages were included within the condemnation award. 
Where IPA consented to the trial in the condemnation action of 
those negligence and breach of contract issues, it was error for 
the Court to distinguish between the damages which occurred 
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within the easement from those which occurred without the 
easement. The case should be remanded for the taking of 
evidence and the entry of judgment for the damages within the 
easement. 
POINT II 
FAILURE TO RESTORE THE FENCES TO THEIR 
ORIGINAL CONDITION WAS A SEPARABLY COMPENSABLE ITEM. 
The trial court also excluded evidence concerning Bowers-
Irons1 claim that cattle guards were necessary to restore the 
fences to their original condition. As set forth above, IPA had 
an obligation to restore the land to its original condition so 
far as reasonably possible. The evidence at trial would have 
supported a jury finding that a wire gate was not adequate to 
restore the fences to their original condition, and that a 
cattle guard was required. 
For the same reasons as set forth above in Point I, Bowers-
Irons was entitled to recover for IPA's breach of its obligation 
to restore the land to its original condition, including the 
failure to restore the fences by installing cattle guards. 
CONCLUSION 
No serious contention can be made that IPA did not have an 
obligation to cause as least damage to the property as possible, 
and to return the land to its original condition so far as 
reasonably possible, and that Bowers-Irons did not have a right 
to recover damages by reason of IPA's failure to do so. 
Although the action for damages would normally be separate from 
a condemnation action, IPA consented to the trial of those 
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issues in this lawsuit. The Court erted in distinguishing 
between the construction damages within tne easement from those 
without the easement. The case should be remanded to the trial 
court for the taking of evidence and the entry of judgment for 
damages within the easement. 
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